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The Verdugo Case:
The United States and the Comity of Nations
Mark W. Janis *
U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez,1 decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on February 28, 1990,
holds that the U.S. Constitution's Fourth Amendment protection against 'unreasonable
searches and seizures' does not apply 'to the search and seizure by United States agents of
property that is owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign country.' 2 Arising
in the context of the U.S. war on drugs, the Verdugo case has important international im-
plications for the law concerning individual rights and state sovereignty. This brief note
discusses the Verdugo case and its relationship to international law, paying particular at-
tention to some of the doctrinal and theoretical assumptions of the different members of
the U.S. Supreme Court.
In Verdugo, Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court; he was joined
by Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. Justice Kennedy also wrote a concur-
ring opinion. Justice Stevens wrote an opinion in which he concurred in the judgment,
though not in the opinion, of the Court. The three more liberal judges - Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun - dissented in two opinions written by Justices
Brennan and Blackmun. So, among the five opinions altogether, none commanded a ma-
jority of the Court.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion recounted how Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez, a ci-
tizen and resident of Mexico, had been seized in Mexico in January 1986 and transported
to the United States where he was arrested on charges of narcotics-related offences and
held pending trial. Thereafter, U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency ('DEA') officials in concert
with the Mexican Federal Judicial Police searched Verdugo's properties in Mexicali and
San Felipe, Mexico, seizing documents that were ultimately used in the prosecution of
Verdugo. Of particular importance was a tally sheet which the U.S. argued as showing
quantities of marijuana smuggled by Verdugo from Mexico into the United States.
However, since U.S. officials had not obtained a search warrant for Verdugo's Mexican
properties, a U.S. district court and a divided Ninth Circuit court agreed with Verdugo's
lawyers that the evidence from Mexico should be suppressed, these two courts holding
that the search and seizure in Mexico violated the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution:
Professor of Law, University of Connecticut.
1 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 58 USLW 4263, U.S., 108 L.Ed. 2d 222, 110 S.Ct. 1056
(1990) [hereinafter cited as Verdugo).
2 Id. at 4264.
2 EJIL (1990) 118
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.3
Reversing the lower courts, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a formal textual reading, con-
cluded that the Fourth Amendment 'by contrast with the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, ex-
tends its reach only to "the people";' 'the purpose of the Fourth Amendment [being] to
protect the people of the United States against arbitrary action by their own
Government.' 4
With this key argument, a majority of the justices disagreed. Justice Kennedy, though
otherwise joining in Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion, refused to 'place any weight on
the reference to "the people" in the Fourth Amendment as a source of restricting its pro-
tections.' 5 Justice Stevens, concurring only in the judgment, wrote that 'aliens who are
lawfully present in the United States are among those "people" who are entitled to the
protection of the Bill of Rights, including the Fourth Amendment.' 6 Justice Brennan,
also writing for Justice Marshall, believed that 'mutuality' between Verdugo and the U.S.
put defendant within the class of 'the people:' 'If we expect aliens to obey our laws,
aliens should be able to expect that we will obey our Constitution when we investigate,
prosecute, and punish them.' 7 And in his dissent, Justice Blackmun, though he distin-
guished between the relationship of the U.S. government and individuals residing in the
U.S. and that involving U.S. and foreign nationals, was 'inclined to agree with Justice
Brennan, however, that when a foreign national is held accountable for purported viola-
tions of United States criminal laws, he has effectively been treated as one of 'the gov-
erned' and therefore is entitled to Fourth Amendment protections.' 8
This crucial difference on the scope of the Fourth Amendment between the opinion of
Chief Justice Rehnquist and the opinions of Justice Kennedy, Stevens, Brennan,
Marshall and Blackmun is not only important for U.S. constitutional analysis, 9 but has
importance for an analysis of the relationship between the United States and interna-
tional law. In large measure, the differing opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court in Verdugo
illustrate differing perceptions of the role of the United States in world affairs. Let us be-
gin with this passage of Chief Justice Rehnquist:
Id. at 4264-65, 856 F.2d 1214 (1988). In 1914, the Supreme Court decided that evidence taken
by the Federal Government in violation of the Fourth Amendment could not be introduced as
evidence in a criminal trial. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). In 1961, this rle of
suppression was extended to the state governments via the 'due process clause' of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
4 Verdugo, supra note 1, at 4265.
5 Id. at 4268.
6 Id. at 4268-69.
7 Id. at 4270.
8 Id. at 4273-74.
9 This note no more than touches on the municipal law implications of Verdugo. Some of the
relevant literature about the Fourth Amendment is reviewed in an analysis of the ultimately re -
versed opinion of the Ninth Circuit in the case. Note, 'The Extraterritorial Applicability of the
Fourth Amendment', 102 Harvard Law Review (1989) 1672. The Note, which paid little atten-
tion to international law or comity, sought 'to balance the imperatives of effective interna-
tional law enforcement and the core values underlying the fourth amendment.' Id. at 1689,
1693.
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For better or worse, we live in a world of nation-states in which our Government
must be able to 'functiotn] effectively in the company of sovereign nations.' Perez v.
Brownwell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958). Some who violate our laws may live outside our
borders under a regime quite different from that which obtains in this country. Situa-
tions threatening to important American interests may arise half-way around the
globe, situations which in the view of the political branches of our Government re-
quire an American response with armed force. If there are to be restrictions on search-
es and seizures which occur incident to such American action, they must be imposed
by the political branches through diplomatic understanding, treaty, or legislation.l 0
What distinguishes the assumptions of this view of Chief Justice Rehnquist from the
assumptions and views of the other four written opinions is the perception of the other
four that there is either a need or some form of legal obligation or, at least, that there is
some wisdom or good sense for a nation, like the United States, to act in cases like
Verdugo in accord with other states. Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion acknowledged
this notion in an indirect fashion, more or less endorsing Chief Justice Rehnquist but
without employing the Chief Justice's power motif:
The absence of local judges or magistrates available to issue warrants, the differing
and perhaps unascertainable conceptions of reasonableness and privacy that prevail
abroad, and the need to cooperate with foreign officials all indicate that the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement should not apply in Mexico as it does in this coun-
try.1 I
Justice Stevens went further down the road to what one might think of as international
comity. He was able to concur in the majority judgment only by basing his decision on
the approval of Mexico as related to the limits on U.S. jurisdiction abroad:
I do agree, however, with the Government's submission that the search conducted by
the United States agents with the approval and cooperation of the Mexican authori-
ties was not 'unreasonable' as that term is used in the first clause of the Amendment. I
do not believe the Warrant Clause has any application to searches of noncitizens'
homes in foreign jurisdictions because American magistrates have no power to autho-
rize such searches. 12
Similar to Justice Stevens and his rationale but reaching the opposite result on the
judgment, Justice Blackmun felt 'that an American magistrate's lack of power to autho-
rize a search abroad renders the Warrant Clause inapplicable to the search of a nonciti-
zen's residence outside this country.' 13 Most cognizant of the values and benefits of
international comity was Justice Brennan. As with his analysis of the reach of the Fourth
Amendment, he stressed here the principle of mutuality:
Mutuality also serves to indicate the values of law and order. By respecting the
rights of foreign nationals, we encourage other nations to respect the rights of our ci-
tizens. Moreover, as our Nation becomes increasingly concerned about the domestic
effects of international crime, we cannot forget that the behavior of our law enforce-
ment agents abroad sends a powerful message about the rule of law to individuals cv-
10 Verdugo,supra note 1, at 4267.
11 Id. at 4268.
12 Id. at 4269.
13 Id. at 4274.
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erywhere. As Justice Brandeis warned in Olmstead v. United States, 277 US 438
(1928):
'If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites
every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the
administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means ... would bring ter-
rible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine, this Court would resolutely set
its face.' Id., at 485 (dissenting opinion).
This principle is no different when the United States applies its rules of conduct to
foreign nationals. If we seek respect for law and order, we must observe these princi-
ples ourselves. Lawlessness breeds lawlessness. 14
As Justice Brennan's complaint of constitutional 'lawlessness' was levelled, albeit in
dissent, against the executive branch in Verdugo, so can there be a complaint of interna-
tional 'lawblindedness' levelled against the opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist.
Although the Chief Justice argued that 'if there were a constitutional violation, it oc-
curred solely in Mexico,' 15 he did so only to assist in his formalistic distinction between
the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments respecting the term 'the
people.' Unlike Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Brennan and Blackmun, Chief Justice
Rehnquist seemed little concerned about the government obtaining Mexican approval for
the U.S. search and seizure in Mexican territory. Indeed, in the paragraph quoted above,
Chief Justice Rehnquist observed that '[s]ome who violate our laws may live outside our
borders under a regime quite different from that which obtains in this country.' 16 What of
foreign sovereignty, of international law, or at least of the comity of nations?
A classic U.S. statement of international comity now almost a century old is that in
Hilton v. Guyot:
'Comity,' in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial
acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience,
and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection
of its laws. 17
Hilton involved the recognition and enforcement of a French commercial judgement in
the United States, a recognition refused because of a failure of reciprocity in French law.
However, the case persuasively enunciated the values espoused by nations and their
courts when they are sensitive to, and respect, the sovereignty of foreign states and for-
eign judicial systems. It is just this international sensitivity that seems so glaringly
missing from the Chief Justice's opinion.
The closest in Verdugo that Chief Justice Rehnquist comes to acknowledging the val-
ues of international cooperation is the last sentence of that same quoted paragraph:
If there are to be restrictions on searches and seizures which occur incident to such
American action, they must be imposed by the political branches through diplomatic
understanding, treaty, or legislation. 18
14 Id. at 4270.
15 Id. at 4265.
16 Id. at 4267.
17 159 U.S. 113, 163-164 (1895).
18 Verdugo, supra note 1, at 4267.
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The word 'treaty' is indeed a fair recognition of the place of international agreements in
U.S. constitutional law,19 but what of 'diplomatic understanding'? It is doubtful that the
Chief Justice's term is meant to convey the notion of customary international law.
Rather, 'diplomatic understanding' seems to mean some sort of unwritten agreement be-
tween states. Indeed, perhaps telephone contacts between U.S. and Mexican officials
about the search of Verdugo's properties 2O might be 'diplomatic understandings,' but we
cannot know for sure. In any event, 'restrictions' imposed by 'diplomatic understanding,
treaty, or legislation' seem to be mentioned just as a finishing aside without factual or
juridical explication. The 'restrictions' are not held out as justifications for the search a
la Kennedy, Stevens or Blackmun. Nor are they elements of mutuality in the fashion of
Brennan.
The underlying assumption about international law and comity in Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion appears to be the sterile positivism of an international case like
Lotus.2 1 What seem to be given presumptive priority are the positive acts of states, here
the search and seizure by the United States in Mexico. Whatever is not prohibited by in-
ternational law apparently is to be permitted. If there are limits in international law, it is
only a law of positive state content, e.g., a treaty or a diplomatic agreement. Such a view
is, I submit, narrow, regressive and short-sighted. As Justice Brennan put it, if I may turn
his phrase from the executive branch to the Court: 'If we seek respect for law and order,
we must observe these principles ourselves.' 2 2
What sadly emerges from Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Verdugo is an unnec-
essary call to, and legal justification based upon, American national self-interest.
Justices Kennedy and Stevens were able to reach the same pragmatic result as Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, i.e., allowing the evidence taken in Mexico to be introduced in the crimi-
nal trial, and still keep an eye on international cooperation. They plainly recognized the
authority of Mexico over its own territory. Indeed Justice Kennedy and Stevens justified
the U.S. warrantless search and seizure in large measure because of the active involve-
ment of the Mexican government, thus encouraging the U.S. government to seek such
cooperation in the future. Justice Blackmun reached a like conclusion about U.S.-
Mexican cooperation but felt the search had still not been proven reasonable on Fourth
Amendment grounds. Justice Brennan, who will be sorely missed on the Supreme Court,
imposed the greatest international restraint on the U.S. government. By stressing 'the
principles of mutuality and fundamental fairness,' Justice Brennan most effectively con-
tributed to the development of international law and order. Most of all of the opinions,
the opinion of Justice Brennan put the Verdugo case and the Fourth Amendment in the
context not only of U.S. constitutional law, but in the larger and equally important con-
text of the law of nations.
19 Article VI(2) of the U.S. Constitution provides that the 'Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the contrary notwithstanding.' The key Supreme Court ruling in this regard is, of
course, Chief Justice Marshall's decision in Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253
(1829). The U.S. jurisprudence is reviewed and analyzed in M.W. Janis, An Introduction to
International Law 72-80 (1988).
20 Verdugo,supra note I, at 4264.
21 France v. Turkey, 1927 PCIJ Reports, Series A. No. 10.
22 Verdugo, supra note 1, at 4270. -
